Sectoral money demand and the great disinflation in the US by Alessandro Calza & Andrea Zaghini
Temi di Discussione
(Working Papers)
Sectoral money demand and the great disinflation in the US



















1   Temi di discussione
(Working papers)
Sectoral money demand and the great disinflation in the US
by Alessandro Calza and Andrea Zaghini
Number 785 - January 2011The purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial  Board:  MARCELLO PERICOLI, SILVIA MAGRI, LUISA CARPINELLI, EMANUELA 
CIAPANNA, DANIELA MARCONI,      ANDREA NERI, MARZIA ROMANELLI, CONCETTA RONDINELLI,
TIZIANO ROPELE, ANDREA SILVESTRINI.
Editorial Assistants: ROBERTO MARANO, NICOLETTA OLIVANTI.SECTORAL MONEY DEMAND AND THE GREAT DISINFLATION IN THE US 
 
by Alessandro Calza






Estimates of the welfare costs of inflation based on Bailey's (1956) methodology are 
typically computed on the basis of aggregate money demand models. Yet, the behavior of 
money demand is likely to vary across sectors. As a result, the impact on welfare of changes 
in the inflation regime may differ between households and firms. We specifically investigate 
the sectoral welfare implications of the shift from the Great Inflation to the present regime of 
low and stable inflation. In order to do so, we estimate different functional specifications of 
sectoral money demand models for US households and non-financial firms using flow of 
funds data covering four decades. We find that the benefits were significant for both 
households and firms. 
 
JEL Classification: E41, C22 





2. Money demand and welfare.................................................................................................7 
3. Data issues...........................................................................................................................9 
4. Sectoral money demand.....................................................................................................11 
5. Welfare cost estimations....................................................................................................16 
6.  Concluding remarks...........................................................................................................20 
References..............................................................................................................................22 
 
                                                           
* European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Tel.: +49-69-1344 6356; Fax: 
+49-69-1344 7183; E-mail: alessandro.calza@ecb.europa.eu. 
**  Bank of Italy, Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy Department – Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Roma. Tel.: 
+39-06-47922994; Fax: +39-06-47923720; E-mail: andrea.zaghini@bancaditalia.it    1 Introduction1
At the height of the Great In￿ ation in 1980, the three-month T-bill interest
rate stood at 15%. By the end of the 1990s, it had declined by around two-
thirds. There is general consensus that moving from a regime in which one of
the closest empirical proxies for a short-term risk-free rate was a double-digit
rate to one in which both nominal interest rates and in￿ ation are low and
stable has yielded substantial welfare bene￿ts. Indeed, a substantial body
of literature has shown that high and volatile in￿ ation entails a number
of economic and social costs, mainly arising from the ine¢ cient allocation
of resources due to increased uncertainty and distortions to relative prices.
Additional sources of welfare costs associated with in￿ ation include high
risk premia, the interaction between in￿ ation and the tax code, ine¢ cient
distraction of resources from production of goods to ￿nancial activities, lower
capital accumulation and arbitrary redistribution of wealth (see for instance
Dri¢ ll et al., 1990, and Fischer, 1995).
A speci￿c source of in￿ ation-related welfare costs - the so-called ￿shoe-
leather costs￿ - arises when agents ine¢ ciently manage their holdings of
monetary balances for transaction purposes because of in￿ ation. The tradi-
tional way to measure the welfare loss arising from ￿shoe-leather costs￿is
based on the methodology by Bailey (1956). He suggests that such costs
can be measured by the area underlying the inverse money demand function,
which represents the lost consumer surplus (net of seigniorage revenues) that
could be gained from reducing the positive nominal interest rate to zero. In-
tuitively, the rationale is that - assuming that monetary balances yield direct
utility via liquidity services and that higher nominal interest rates increase
the opportunity cost of holding monetary balances - higher expected in￿ ation
will lead to agents ine¢ ciently economising on their monetary balances, via
its impact on nominal interest rates.
A large number of studies have used Bailey￿ s approach to estimate the
welfare costs of in￿ ation arising from distortions to money demand. For
instance, Fischer (1981) estimates the cost of a 10% in￿ ation rate at around
0.3% of US GNP per year. A review by Gillman (1995) reports signi￿cantly
larger estimates, ranging between 0.85% and 3% of US income, for the same
1We are grateful to Giuseppe Grande, Paul Kramp, Qiang Li, Francesco Lippi, Masao
Ogaki, and an anonymous referee for many interesting suggestions and comments. The
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect the
opinions of Banca d￿ Italia or the European Central Bank.
5in￿ ation rate. More recently, an in￿ uential study by Lucas (2000) using
annual data covering most of the twentieth century argues that the welfare
gains from reducing in￿ ation could be signi￿cant. In particular, reducing
the annual in￿ ation rate from 10% to zero would lead to welfare gains of
slightly less than 1% of GNP per year in perpetuity. By contrast, a paper by
Ireland (2009), focusing on the sample 1980-2004, concludes that the welfare
gains from eliminating in￿ ation altogether would be signi￿cantly lower in
the current monetary regime of low interest rates. Likewise, Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (2000) suggest that the welfare costs at low in￿ ation rates are
limited, once one takes into account changes in portfolio allocation behavior
across in￿ ation regimes.2
Estimations of the welfare costs of in￿ ation are usually based on aggregate
money demand functions, i.e. equations representing the equilibrium demand
for real monetary holdings for the US economy as a whole.3 Yet, Goldfeld
(1976) and Jain and Moon (1994) show that money demand behavior signi￿-
cantly di⁄ers between US households and ￿rms. Indeed, di⁄erences in terms
of motives for demanding monetary holdings, cash management practices,
patterns of usage of banking and ￿nancial products, access to alternative
payments technology, etc. are likely to result in di⁄erent sectoral responses
to variations in the key money demand determinants, such as scale variables
and opportunity cost measures.
Thus, one would expect that the welfare costs associated with high in￿ a-
tion should also di⁄er across the di⁄erent sectors of the economy. This issue
is important since it implies that di⁄erent categories of agents may have a
di⁄erent assessment of the welfare losses associated with high-in￿ ation or,
conversely, of the welfare gains arising from moving to a low in￿ ation regime.
In particular, there is consensus that the end of the Great Disin￿ ation and
the shift to the present low in￿ ation regime has yielded substantial welfare
gains to the population at large, but we do not know much about how the
magnitude of these bene￿ts compares across di⁄erent sectors.
The purpose of this paper is speci￿cally to analyse the welfare impact for
2Based on household survey data, the authors argue that when interest rates are low,
the interest rate elasticity of aggregate money demand becomes very small since only a
limited fraction of households participates in ￿nancial markets due to the reduced incentive
to hold interest-bearing assets. As a result, when nominal interest rates are close to zero,
money demand hardly reacts to changes in interest rates, so that reducing in￿ ation can
no longer bring signi￿cant welfare gains via its stimulating e⁄ect on monetary balances.
3Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin￿ s (2000) study on US households is an exception.
6households and ￿rms of the modern disin￿ ation using Bailey￿ s methodology.
In order to do so, we perform a sectoral analysis of the welfare costs of in-
￿ ation using di⁄erent speci￿cations of money demand models for households
and ￿rms estimated on the basis of ￿ ow-of-funds data over the period from
1959 to 2006. To preview our results, we estimate stable long-run money
demand relationships for both sectors and we ￿nd that both households and
￿rms bene￿ted signi￿cantly from moving to the present low in￿ ation regime.
The welfare gains represent a greater share of the transaction variable for
households than ￿rms; however, once rescaled to a common transaction vari-
able, the welfare gains of the two sectors turn out to be of a comparable size.
In addition, our aggregate results are closer to the in￿ ation costs reported
by Fischer (1981) and Ireland (2009) than those by Lucas (2000).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we brie￿ y recall Bailey￿ s
approach to the measurement of the welfare cost of in￿ ation. Section 3 deals
with some relevant data issues. Section 4 presents the results of estimates of
a double-log and a semi-log money demand function for both US households
and ￿rms. Section 5 evaluates the welfare gains from reducing in￿ ation to
zero and Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Money demand and welfare
An issue that has received signi￿cant attention in the literature on the welfare
costs of in￿ ation is the choice of functional form for the long-run money de-
mand relationship. The two main competing speci￿cations are: 1) Meltzer￿ s
(1963) log-log function and 2) Cagan￿ s (1956) semi-log function. The log-log
function is speci￿ed as follows:
log(m) = log(A) + ￿ log(y) ￿ ￿ log(r) (1)
where m are monetary balances, y is a measure of the volume of transactions,
r is the nominal interest rate (the opportunity cost of holding the non-interest
bearing asset), A > 0 is a constant, ￿ and ￿ denote the elasticities (in
absolute values) with respect to the transaction variable and the interest
rate, respectively. Money and scale variables are typically measured in real
terms. Similarly, the semi-log function is as follows:
log(m) = log(B) + ￿ log(y) ￿ ￿r (2)
7where B > 0 is a constant and ￿ denotes the absolute value of the interest
rate semi-elasticity.
Applying Bailey￿ s method to the log-log money demand function (1), we
obtain the following measure of the welfare costs associated with a positive
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1 ￿ (1 + ￿r)e
￿￿r￿
(4)
In practical terms, these measures - the so-called ￿welfare triangles￿- are
obtained as integrals of the inverse money demand function (i.e. expressed as
function of the nominal interest rate) on the interval [0;r]. A positive value of
the nominal interest rate as a result of expected in￿ ation implies a positive
opportunity cost of holding money and leads to the monetary balances of
agents falling below their optimal level.4 Thus, the ￿welfare triangle￿mea-
sures the consumer surplus lost by agents by ine¢ ciently foregoing services
provided by money in facilitating exchanges because of in￿ ation. Also note
that the welfare costs due to living in an economy where the steady state
interest rate is r instead of zero are expressed as fractions of the transaction
variable.
When the elasticity of money with respect to the transaction variable (￿)
is unitary, the transaction variable drops out of (3) and (4) and, given the
estimated parameters of the money demand function, the computation of the
welfare triangles for any given level of interest rate is straightforward. When
the elasticity is di⁄erent from one, a value of the transaction variable must
be speci￿ed in order to be able to calculate the welfare costs (Gillman, 1995).
Lucas (2000) argues that the log-log functional form (1) provides a supe-
rior description of the historical behavior of US money demand and a more
precise calculation of the welfare costs of in￿ ation, particularly at low inter-
est rates. In addition, he notes that, in the framework of the shopping-time
4According to the Friedman￿ s (1969) rule, the optimal amount of money is given by the
level of money demand in correspondence to a zero nominal interest rate, which requires
a de￿ ation rate equal to the real rate of return on capital.
8model of money demand determination by McCallum and Goodfriend (1987)
and for reasonable estimates of the interest rate elasticity, the log-log money
demand equation is consistent with inventory-theoretic money demand mod-
els, such as the Baumol-Tobin model. Chadha et al. (1998) concur on the
theoretical superiority of the log-log form. Also using McCallum and Good-
friend￿ s model, these authors show that the choice of any well-behaved utility
function and transactions technology (e.g. Cobb-Douglas, CES and translog
functions) is likely to result in a log-log speci￿cation of long-run money de-
mand.
While theoretical considerations and secular empirical evidence seem to
support the log-log functional form, Ireland (2009) has recently argued that
the post-1980 data are better described by a semi-log function. In the au-
thor￿ s view, the monetary policy regime shift following the appointment of
Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979 and the reforms to
the regulatory framework introduced by the Depository Institutions Dereg-
ulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980 led to a shift in money demand
behavior warranting a change in the preferred speci￿cation.
As our study focuses on a sample period (1959-2006) which entirely com-
prises that examined by Ireland (1980-2006), but is shorter and only partly
overlapping with Lucas￿(1900-1994), it is di¢ cult to tell ex-ante which of
the two alternative speci￿cations is likelier to prove more appropriate. Thus,
in the empirical analysis we consider both speci￿cations and we separately
assess their associated welfare cost functions.
3 Data issues
The empirical exercise is based on a sample period spanning from the ￿rst
quarter of 1959 (the earliest date for which data on sectoral monetary hold-
ing are available) to the fourth quarter of 2006. Since we want to study
the welfare gains of the modern disin￿ ation for di⁄erent sectors of the US
economy, it is important to ascertain whether this sample period adequately
captures the shift from the double-digit in￿ ation rates during the Great In￿ a-
tion to the present regime of low and stable in￿ ation. The sample pre-dates
the switch to the Great In￿ ation by around one decade, indicating that the
starting date is adequate. In addition, based on a review of econometric esti-
mates of trend in￿ ation and surveys on in￿ ation expectations, Mishkin (2007)
argues that the process of disin￿ ation and the re-anchoring of long-term in-
9￿ ation expectations was completed by the end of the 1990s, suggesting that
the ending date of our sample adequately captures the return to a regime
of low and stable in￿ ation. More generally, the chosen horizon provides a
su¢ ciently long coverage of periods of both high and low in￿ ation to allow
to draw conclusions about money demand behavior across di⁄erent in￿ ation
regimes.
Sectoral data on holdings of monetary assets by households and non-
￿nancial corporations are sourced from the Federal Reserve Board￿ s ￿ ow of
funds accounts. These accounts include statistical information on aggregate
sectoral holdings of checkable deposits and currency, by households and non-
pro￿t organizations (Table L.100) and by non-￿nancial ￿rms (Table L.101).
Monetary data are available at a quarterly frequency and refer to end-of-
period outstanding amounts and have been seasonally adjusted using the
X12-ARIMA seasonal adjustment method. Real balances are obtained by
dividing monetary holdings by GDP de￿ ator.
The aggregation of checkable deposits and currency corresponds to the de-
￿nition of the monetary aggregate M1 used by Lucas (2000). As for the scale
variables, following Jain and Moon (1994), we rely on business sector GDP
for ￿rms and personal consumption expenditures for households. Business
sector GDP is given by US GDP excluding gross value added of households,
of non-pro￿t institutions serving households and of general government. Per-
sonal consumption expenditure is a measure of goods and services purchased
by US residents. Annualised seasonally adjusted nominal data (in US bil-
lions) on business GDP and consumption expenditures are available at a
quarterly frequency from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Tables 1.3.5 and
2.1, respectively), together with the corresponding price index (Tables 1.3.4
and 2.3.4). Finally, the interest rate is the period average of the rate of return
on the three-month Treasury bill, sourced from the Federal Reserve Board,
and is expressed in percentage points.
An important issue related to the data on monetary holdings is the need
to control for the e⁄ect on households￿checkable deposits of the wide use of
retail deposit sweep programs by banks. As explained by Anderson (1995,
2003), in order to economise on their statutory reserve requirements, starting
from January 1994 US banks have used software programmes that ￿sweep￿
funds from demand deposits (that are subject to statutory reserve require-
ments) to money market deposit accounts (a type of savings accounts and,
therefore, subject to a zero percent reserve ratio) at the end of each business
day. The sweep movements performed by banks involve only re-classi￿cations
10of the balances in their customers￿accounts rather than shifts in the demand
for money from economic agents, who are likely to perceive themselves to own
signi￿cantly larger holdings of transaction deposits than reported by banks in
their balance sheets. Therefore, in order to understand the money demand
behavior of US households, it is essential to add the estimated amount of
transaction deposits involved in the retail sweep programs to the holdings
of checkable deposits reported in the ￿ ow-of-funds statistics. In this paper
we use the estimates of transaction deposits a⁄ected by the retail sweep pro-
grams documented in detail in Cynamon et al. (2006),5 that have been used
in previous empirical money demand studies (e.g. Dutkowsky and Cynamon,
2003, Dutkowsky et al., 2006, and Ireland, 2009).
4 Sectoral money demand
Equilibrium money demand relationships are conventionally estimated in a
cointegration analysis framework. As a preliminary step, the statistical prop-
erties of the variables are examined using standard unit root tests (augmented
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron) as well as the KPSS stationarity test. The
results - not reported for the sake of brevity - suggest that over the considered
sample period all the variables can be modelled as I(1) in levels.
We test for cointegration using two sets of single-equation tests: (1) the
error-correction model (ECM) tests by Zivot (1994) as described by Maddala
and Kim (1998); and (2) the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) residual-based tests.
The ￿rst Zivot test involves the preliminary estimation of a two-step error
correction model. The null-hypothesis of no cointegration is then tested by
means of a standard t-test of the signi￿cance of the loading factor of the
error correction term. Under the second Zivot test, the ECM is estimated
in a single step and the null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested by
applying a standard Wald test to the restriction that the variables forming the
cointegrating vector can be jointly excluded from the model. The Phillips-
Ouliaris residual-based tests are conducted by applying the Phillips-Perron Zt
and Zq unit root tests to the residuals of the estimated equilibrium equation
speci￿ed as in (1) or (2). Under the null hypothesis, the residuals contain a
unit root and the equation does not represent a cointegrating relationship.
5The data can be downloaded from a webpage dedicated to the is-
sue of the e⁄ect of sweep programs maintained by these three authors
(http://www.sweepmeasures.com/data.html).
11The results of the Zivot tests indicate strong evidence of cointegration for
both households and ￿rms, regardless of the choice of speci￿cation (Table 1).
The evidence is less uniform across sectors and functional speci￿cations when
the Phillips-Ouliaris tests are used. Indeed, the results of the tests seem to
provide more robust evidence of cointegration for households and ￿rms, when
the semi-log speci￿cation is used. By contrast, when the log-log speci￿cation
is used, the null of no cointegration can be rejected only for households (and
in this case at a lower signi￿cance level than for the semi-log speci￿cation).
Table 1. Cointegration tests
HOUSEHOLDS FIRMS
Semi-log Log-log Semi-log Log-log
Zivot￿ s two-step ECM ￿3:837￿￿ ￿3:915￿￿ ￿3:619￿￿ ￿2:552￿￿
Zivot￿ s one-step ECM 13:676￿￿ 12:479￿￿ 19:217￿￿ 13:146￿￿
Phillips-Ouliaris Zt ￿3:660￿ ￿3:383y ￿3:680￿ ￿3:134
Phillips-Ouliaris Zq ￿26:003￿ ￿22:182y ￿24:588￿ ￿17:970
Note: y, *, ** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 15%, 10% and 5% critical levels,
respectively. The statistic for Zivot￿ s two-step ECM-based test is distributed as a
standard t-distribution; the single-step ECM-based test as ￿2(3):The Zq and Zt
statistics are computed using the Newey-West estimator of the error variance with
lag truncation q = 4, following the sample-dependent rule q = 4(T=100)
2=9.
A recent study by Choi et al. (2008) argues that the failure to detect coin-
tegration using standard cointegration tests may be due to non-stationary
measurement error in the variables or the omission of relevant I(1) explana-
tory variables. Money demand models may be particularly a⁄ected by this
problem because of the di¢ culty to measure the holdings of domestic agents
or the very large number of factors potentially a⁄ecting money demand be-
havior. In order to address this problem, Choi et al. (2008) propose a
cointegration test in the spirit of the Hausman test that speci￿cally accounts
for the possibility of spurious regressions arising from non-stationarity of the
error in the regression.6
6Like the Hausman test, Choi et al.￿ s (2008) cointegration test compares two di⁄erent
12We use Choi et al.￿ s (2008) Hausman-type test to further investigate the
log-log speci￿cations, for which the results of the Phillips-Ouliaris test were
either not entirely clear-cut (in the case of households) or unfavorable (in the
case of ￿rms). The results of the Hausman-type test support the existence
of cointegration for the household sector under the log-log speci￿cation. By
contrast, they provide evidence against the null hypothesis of cointegration
for the ￿rm sector when the log-log speci￿cation is used.7
Overall, the results of our cointegration analysis using di⁄erent tests is
fairly supportive of the existence of cointegration for the household sector,
regardless of the speci￿cation used. As regards the corporate sector, the
empirical evidence is fairly robust for the semi-log speci￿cation, but weaker
for the log-log speci￿cation.
We estimate the long-run sectoral equilibrium money demand functions
for households and ￿rms under both functional speci￿cations (1) and (2), us-
ing four alternative single-equation estimators: (1) the dynamic OLS method
by Saikkonen (1991); (2) the autoregressive distributed lag modelling ap-
proach by Pesaran and Shin (1999); (3) the fully modi￿ed OLS method by
Phillips and Hansen (1990); and (4) the Engle and Yoo￿ s (1991) three-step
approach to the OLS-based Engle and Granger procedure. The lag speci￿-
cation of the models (as well as of the leads in the case of the dynamic OLS)
is chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimates of the long run coe¢ cients of the
money demand functions for households and ￿rms, respectively, under the
alternative functional speci￿cations. The estimated long-run coe¢ cients for
both the scale variable and the interest rate are statistically signi￿cant at
the conventional levels, regardless of the functional speci￿cation or estima-
tion procedure used.8 The estimated coe¢ cients for any given functional
estimators: (1) the authors￿GLS corrected dynamic regression estimator, which is con-
sistent under both the null of cointegrating regression and the alternative hypothesis of
spurious regression; and (2) the dynamic OLS by Saikkonen (1991), which is consistent un-
der the null hypothesis only. In practice, the GLS corrected estimator is a ￿rst di⁄erenced
version of the dynamic OLS.
7The test statistic for the log-log speci￿cation of households (with four lags in levels)
is 0.030; the corresponding statistic for ￿rms is 37.850. The test is distributed as ￿2(2):
critical values are 4.61 and 5.99 for the 10% and 5% signi￿cance levels. The test is for the
null hypothesis of cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of spurious regression.
8Di⁄erences in sample coverage and the de￿nition of the variables diminish the in-
formation content of comparisons with previous studies. For instance, using a sample
spanning the 1960-90 period Jain and Moon (1994) estimate the consumption elasticity of
13form tend to be consistent across estimators (though the ranges of the esti-
mated coe¢ cients are slightly wider for ￿rms than for households), suggesting
that the results are fairly robust to the choice of econometric methodology.
The signs and magnitude of the coe¢ cients are in all cases consistent with
the interpretation of the cointegrating vectors as equilibrium money demand
relationships.
Table 2. Long-run money demand functions of households
LOG-LOG SEMI-LOG





































Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical signi￿cance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical levels, respectively. DOLS denotes the dynamic
OLS by Saikkonen (1991), ARDL the autoregressive distributed lag model by
Pesaran and Shin (1999), FMOLS the fully modi￿ed method of Phillips and
Hansen (1990), and EY the Engle and Yoo￿ s (1991) three-step Engle and Granger
procedure. The number of lags (and leads for DOLS) in levels used for the
estimation are speci￿ed next to the estimator. Newey and West standard errors
except in the case of FMOLS in which a quadratic spectral kernel is used.
household M1 holdings at 0.464, a value slightly below those reported in Table 2. However,
these authors￿model includes a long-term rather a short-term interest rate. No evidence of
cointegration is found for the corporate sector over the same sample period. An empirical
study by Butkiewicz and McConnell (1995) over the 1952-1990 sample period estimates
the interest rate elasticity of the 3-month T-bill rate for the household sector at 0.103,
slightly below our own estimates, but their model includes a di⁄erent transaction variable
(disposable personal income).
14Based on this empirical exercise, we are able to estimate long-run money
demand functions with statistically signi￿cant and plausible coe¢ cients un-
der the alternative functional forms for both the household and the corporate
sector. However, given the relatively broad time span covered by the sample
period, it is important to test for the stability of the sectoral money demand
relationships before moving on to the computation of the welfare costs. For
this purpose, we use the MeanF and SupF tests for cointegrated regression
models - based on the mean and maximum, respectively, of Chow-type sta-
tistics for all possible break points - suggested by Hansen (1992). The MeanF
test is designed to detect gradual shifts over time that result in model insta-
bility, while the SupF test is more appropriate to reveal instability arising
from an abrupt regime shift. Since the null hypothesis is stability, a low p-
value of the test statistic (say below 0.10) should be interpreted as indicative
of parameter instability. In this empirical application, the tests are based on
the fully modi￿ed OLS estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3.9
Table 3. Long-run money demand functions of ￿rms
LOG-LOG SEMI-LOG





































Note: See note to Table 2.
The results of the test indicate that the null hypothesis of joint parameter
stability of the sectoral models cannot be rejected at the conventional signif-
9The test is computed using a GAUSS code by Bruce Hansen that can be downloaded
from his webpage (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/progs/jbes_92.html).
15icance levels, suggesting that the models capture fairly stable relationships
over the sample period considered.
Table 4. Stability tests of sectoral money demand functions
HOUSEHOLDS FIRMS

















Note: Tests based on fully modi￿ed OLS estimates over the sample￿ s
trimmed region [0.15,0.85]. P-values are based on asymptotic distributions
calculated using Monte Carlo simulations by Hansen (1992).
5 Welfare cost estimations
In this section, we estimate the welfare gains associated with the transition
from a regime of high in￿ ation to one in which in￿ ation is stable at low levels.
In order to calculate the welfare triangles, we use the estimates of the long-
run coe¢ cients ￿;￿ and ￿ in Tables 2 and 3, and calibrate the values of the
constants A and B so that they equal the average value over the sample of
my￿r￿￿ and my￿e￿￿r (as suggested by Lucas, 2000). The estimated long-run
coe¢ cients together with the constants de￿ne the horizontal position and
curvature of the money demand functions for each sector.
As mentioned earlier, if the elasticity of money with respect to the trans-
action variable is di⁄erent from one, we also need to specify a value for the
relevant scale variable. In order to ensure that the welfare calculations at
di⁄erent in￿ ation levels are time-independent, we set the level of the scale
variables at their average value over the sample period. Substituting these
values and the parameters of the money demand equations in (3) and (4), we
can compute the welfare gains associated with a speci￿c level of the interest
rate.
At the height of the Great In￿ ation in 1980, the three-month T-bill rate
stood at 15%. According to our estimates, the welfare cost of such level of
the nominal interest rate for the US households ranged between 0.23% and
160.26% (depending on the estimator used) of annual personal consumption
in perpetuity under a log-log function; and between 0.33% and 0.39% when
a semi-log function is used (see Table 5). For US ￿rms, the welfare costs
associated with a 15% nominal interest rate ranged between 0.16% and 0.24%
of annual business GDP for the log-log function; and between 0.24% and
0.31% under the semi-log function (see Table 6).
Table 5. Welfare cost of in￿ ation for households (as a percentage
of consumption)
LOG-LOG SEMI-LOG
w(0:15) w(0:05) ￿w w(0:15) w(0:05) ￿w
DOLS 0:23 0:09 0:14 0:33 0:04 0:29
ARDL 0:26 0:10 0:16 0:33 0:04 0:29
FMOLS 0:25 0:09 0:15 0:39 0:05 0:34
EY 0:25 0:10 0:15 0:33 0:04 0:29
Note: Values expressed in percentage points of US private consumption
expenditures. Model speci￿cations as in Table 1.
Following Volker￿ s disin￿ ation in the early 1980s, the US economy grad-
ually moved towards a regime of moderate and stable in￿ ation during which
the nominal in￿ ation rate declined to low single-digit ￿gures. By 1999, the
3-month T-bill rate had decreased to around 5%. Our estimates suggest that
the sectoral welfare gains from this favorable regime shift were non negli-
gible. Indeed, we estimate that the welfare gains for households from the
reduction in nominal interest rate from 15% to 5% amounted to between
0.14% and 0.16% (depending on the estimator used) of annual private con-
sumption under a log-log function and to between 0.29% and 0.34% under a
semi-log speci￿cation. The welfare gains were also non-negligible for ￿rms:
0.09%-0.13% of business GDP under the log-log speci￿cation compared to
0.21%-0.26% under the semi-log speci￿cation.
17Table 6. Welfare cost of in￿ ation for ￿rms (as a percentage of
business GDP)
LOG-LOG SEMI-LOG
w(0:15) w(0:05) ￿w w(0:15) w(0:05) ￿w
DOLS 0:19 0:08 0:11 0:26 0:04 0:22
ARDL 0:17 0:07 0:10 0:24 0:04 0:21
FMOLS 0:24 0:11 0:13 0:31 0:05 0:26
EY 0:16 0:06 0:09 0:24 0:04 0:21
Note: Values expressed as percentage points of US business GDP.
Model speci￿cations as in Table 2.
How do our results compare with other recent studies, such as Lucas
(2000) and Ireland (2009)? These studies typically report estimates of the
welfare gains from reducing the in￿ ation rate from 10% to 0%. Assuming
a steady-state real interest rate of 3% (broadly consistent with estimates of
the natural interest rate at the end of the 1990s by Laubach and Williams,
2003), this would be equivalent to estimating the welfare gains from bringing
the nominal interest rate from r = 13% to r = 3%. Welfare measures are
usually expressed as a fraction of the scale variable and studies focusing on
the US economy as a whole typically refer to GDP. By contrast, in our study
the welfare measures are expressed in terms of units of a smaller aggregate
which represents the most relevant measure of the transaction volume for the
sector under consideration (speci￿cally, private consumption for households
and business GDP for ￿rms). Thus, in order to compare our welfare measures
with other studies, we ￿rst need to rescale them to GDP units. This is simply
done by using the average ratio of each sectoral scale variable to GDP over
the sample period. Table 7 presents the rescaled values of the sectoral welfare
costs obtained using the DOLS procedure.10
10No signi￿cant changes are obtained when using the other econometric methodologies.
18Table 7. Welfare gains from a ten percentage point reduction in
in￿ ation (as a percentage of GDP)
HOUSEHOLDS FIRMS AGGREGATE
Log-log Semi-log Log-log Semi-log Log-log Semi-log
w(0:13) 0:13% 0:17% 0:13% 0:16% 0:26% 0:33%
w(0:03) 0:03% 0:01% 0:04% 0:01% 0:07% 0:02%
￿w 0:10% 0:16% 0:09% 0:15% 0:19% 0:31%
Note: Values expressed in percentage points of US GDP.
Estimates of welfare costs obtained using DOLS speci￿cations in Tables 2 and 3.
Values rescaled to GDP units using average ratio of consumption and business
GDP to GDP over the sample period (64.8% and 78.0%, respectively).
We estimate the welfare gains for households from a ten percentage point
reduction in the in￿ ation rate at 0.10% of US domestic output under a log-log
function and at 0.16% under a semi-log speci￿cation. The welfare gains for
￿rms are very similar: 0.09% of GDP annual under a log-log speci￿cation and
0.15% under a semi-log function. Thus, once rescaled to a common measure-
ment unit, the welfare gains across sectors from moving to the present low
in￿ ation regime are estimated at very similar values. In addition, regardless
of the sector considered, the estimated welfare gains from reducing in￿ ation
are higher under a semi-log speci￿cation than under a log-log functional form.
Since the household and the non-￿nancial corporate sector together ac-
count for most of US money demand, the aggregation of welfare costs across
these two sectors should provide a relatively close approximation of the costs
for the economy as a whole.11 Depending on the functional speci￿cation used,
we estimate the aggregate welfare gain from reducing the nominal interest
rate from 13% to 3% at between 0.19% of annual GDP under the log-log
form and 0.31% under the semi-log speci￿cation. Thus, our estimates are
fairly close to those reported by Ireland (2009) and Fischer (1981): 0.25%
11By looking only at the holdings of the two main sectors, we may somewhat under-
estimate overall welfare costs of in￿ ation. On the other hand, traditional estimates of
shoe-leather costs for the economy as a whole may, to some extent, overestimate the costs
due to measurement errors (e.g. because of their di¢ culty to exclude foreign demand for
currency).
19and 0.30% of annual income, respectively; but signi￿cantly below the value
of 1% reported by Lucas (2000).
A key source of the di⁄erence in the estimated welfare cost is the value of
the interest rate elasticity and semi-elasticity. Our empirical exercise for the
log-log speci￿cation suggests that Lucas￿ s calibrated value of 0.5 is probably
too high over our shorter but updated sample. Depending on the estimator
used, we ￿nd that the interest rate elasticity of money demand is around
0.12-0.13 for households and between 0.18 and 0.27 for ￿rms. Thus, even our
highest estimate of the more interest-rate sensitive sector is about half the
value used by Lucas for the calibration of the US aggregate money demand.
Also in the case of the semi-log function, we ￿nd that the value used by Lucas
to calibrate his money demand function (7) is probably too high. In fact,
all our estimates of the interest rate semi-elasticity for the household sector
(ranging between 2.520 and 3.038) and most of those for the non-￿nancial
corporate sector (ranging between 4.558 and 6.280) are much smaller than
Lucas￿value. Similarly, di⁄erences in sample coverage and estimated interest
rate semi-elasticities may help to explain the (much smaller) gap between
our estimates of welfare costs and those by Ireland (2009). Indeed, using
a shorter sample period than ours, Ireland estimates the aggregate interest
rate semi-elasticity at close to 2.
Finally, Table 7 shows that the sectoral welfare costs associated with
r = 3 are fairly small, particularly when the semi-log speci￿cation is used.
This ￿nding is consistent with Ireland￿ s (2009) conclusion that, as far as shoe-
leather costs are concerned, the additional welfare improvements stemming
from implementing a zero in￿ ation policy rather than targeting a low but
still positive in￿ ation rate (as the Fed currently does) would be limited.12
6 Concluding remarks
This paper presents empirical estimates of the welfare cost of in￿ ation in
the US economy in the spirit of the literature initiated by Bailey (1956) and
Friedman (1969) and, more recently, revisited by Lucas (2000) and Ireland
(2009). This literature focuses on a speci￿c source of in￿ ation-related welfare
losses: the shoe-leather costs that arise when agents ine¢ ciently economise
12Feldstein (1997) has argued that the welfare gains from moving to price stability can
be substantial even at low in￿ ation levels, when sources of welfare losses other than shoe-
leather costs (notably, the interaction between in￿ ation and the tax system) are considered.
20on their monetary balances for transaction purposes because of positive in-
￿ ation.
The main innovation of the paper is to look at the issue from a sectoral
perspective. Indeed, estimates of the welfare costs of in￿ ation are usually
based on money demand functions for the economy as a whole. However,
empirical evidence (e.g. Goldfeld, 1976, and Jain and Moon, 1994) shows that
money demand behavior signi￿cantly di⁄ers across US sectors, suggesting
that the application of Bailey￿ s (1956) methodology to measure shoe-leather
costs may yield di⁄erent results across sectors.
Allowing for sectoral heterogeneity in the estimation of welfare costs of
in￿ ation is potentially very important for policy purposes since it implies
that di⁄erent categories of agents may have diverging views on the welfare
losses associated with living in a high in￿ ation environment or on the bene￿ts
stemming from moving to a low in￿ ation environment. In particular, US
households and ￿rms may di⁄erently value the permanent welfare bene￿ts
that they secured with the regime shift from the Great In￿ ation to the current
environment of moderate and stable in￿ ation and interest rates.
We provide a quantitative assessment of the sectoral di⁄erences in the
welfare gains from such regime shift. In order to do so, we estimate di⁄erent
functional speci￿cations of sectoral money demand for households and non-
￿nancial ￿rms, using ￿ ow of funds data covering four decades. Our estimates
of the welfare gains for households amount to between approximately 1
6%
and 1
3% of annual private consumption (depending on whether a log-log or
a semi-log function is used) and for ￿rms between 1
9% and 1
4% of business
GDP, thus suggesting that households might have bene￿ted slightly more
than ￿rms from the shift to the present low in￿ ation regime. However, once
we rescale these ￿gures to a common transaction variable, the estimated
sectoral welfare gains turn out to be of similar magnitude across sectors.
A limitation of this study is of course that, by focusing on the shoe-leather
costs, it follows a partial-equilibrium approach to measuring the welfare costs
of in￿ ation. Some authors (e.g. Dotsey and Ireland, 1996) have argued that,
by looking only at a speci￿c source of distortions, Bailey￿ s (1956) approach
may signi￿cantly underestimate the true cost of in￿ ation.13 It would be
interesting to investigate in future research how the sectoral welfare costs of
in￿ ation vary in a general equilibrium framework.
13Recently, Ascari and Ropele (2010) proposed a welfare based sacri￿ce ratio in a DSGE
frameework.
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